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UNFORESEEN SIDE EFFECTS:  THE IMPACT 
OF FORCIBLY MEDICATING CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS ON SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
You are the foreperson on a jury in a brutal murder trial where a 
man has been accused of killing his wife and children.  The defendant is 
raising the defense of insanity.  The trial starts with the prosecution 
laying out the background of the case.  Your eyes wander to the 
defendant.  He stares into space and his tongue darts from between his 
lips every few seconds.  He does not seem to be concerned about the trial 
going on around him, though his very life depends on its outcome.1 
As the trial progresses, the evidence becomes increasingly gruesome.  
Pictures of the crime scene, enlarged to poster size, are displayed.  
Several of the jurors become very emotional and physically ill at the 
sight of the pictures.  You observe the defendant, calmly sipping on a 
glass of water.  You find his lack of reaction very disturbing.   
The judge adjourns the trial for the day.  In the elevator, you are with 
another juror.  After a little small talk he suddenly says, “Did you notice 
how the defendant just sat there and didn’t seem to bat an eye when 
those pictures were up there?  I mean, he acted like he was in another 
world!”  You nod and then the door opens.  You go home and have a 
restless night.   
The next day, the prosecution rests and the defense opens its case 
with a doctor, a psychiatrist.  The doctor testifies to the mental state of 
the defendant at the time of the crime, indicating that the defendant has 
recently been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.  He describes the 
symptoms, which do not comport with the current behavior of the 
defendant.  The defense then turns the questioning to the current 
condition of the defendant. 
                                                 
1 All events described in this hypothetical are fictional.  However, commonly used anti-
psychotic medications such as Mellaril and Thorazine, the least potent of the antipsychotic 
medications, cause side effects such as agitation, disorientation, sedation, muscle spasms, 
drooling, and various other neurological and non-neurological side effects.  William P. 
Ziegelmueller, Comment, Sixth Amendment—Due Process on Drugs: The Implications of 
Forcibly Medicating Pre-Trial Detainees with Antipsychotic Drugs: Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 
1810 (1992), 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 836, 838-39 (1993). 
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The defendant’s doctor reveals that the defendant is now heavily 
medicated with a powerful psychotropic drug.  The doctor lists the very 
behavior you have been witnessing as side effects.  After extensive 
testimony, you begin to see a picture of the defendant’s mental state.  
You realize that he is perhaps not in full control of his faculties. 
The time for deliberations arrives.  Debate is heated from the 
beginning. 
“I don’t think I can convict him,” begins one juror.  “That doctor said 
he acts that way because he is medicated.  I don’t even know how they 
could put him on trial—he obviously isn’t with it.” 
“You can’t try someone unless they are competent.  It’s in the 
Constitution.  If there was something wrong with him, he would be in a 
mental hospital!”  exclaimed the juror you met in the elevator.  “When 
this trial first started, I was disturbed by the defendant’s lack of emotion.  
Those side effects are just an excuse.  If someone shows you a picture of 
your dead wife and kids slashed to bits, you are going to react, no matter 
how medicated you are.” 
People start to nod in agreement.  After more debate, you call for a 
vote.  The vote is unanimous for conviction.   
Approximately sixteen percent of inmates in state prisons are 
identified as mentally ill.2  In fact, an estimated 280,000 people currently 
incarcerated in prison suffer from mental illness.3 
In the past decade, many cases have presented the issue of whether 
the government can forcibly medicate a person with antipsychotic 
medications for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand a 
criminal trial.4  As a result, issues have arisen concerning the 
                                                 
2 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and Probationers 
(1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/mhtip.htm. Additionally, 
approximately 7% of federal prisoners, 16% of those in jail, and 16% of probationers are 
also identified as mentally ill.  Id.  Inmates identified as mentally ill in state prisons, are 
more likely to be incarcerated for violent offenses than those without a mental illness.  Id.  
Nearly 30% of mentally ill persons incarcerated for violent crimes are recidivists.  Id. at 5.  
Further, mentally ill inmates present much more of a disciplinary problem while 
incarcerated than those without mental illness.  Id. at 9. 
3 Id. at 3. 
4 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (articulating the standard for determining 
when forcible medication of pre-trial detainees is permissible); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 
127 (1992) (reversing a conviction of a defendant who was forcibly medicated with 
 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/8
2006] Forcibly Medicating Criminal Defendants 457 
constitutional rights of these mentally ill detainees, and whether forcible 
medication is an acceptable constitutional remedy to the problem 
presented.5  The current standard articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court is not working and results in the violation of the 
detainee’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. 
Part II of this Note provides the legal background to the issue of 
forcible medication.6  Part III analyzes the application of the standards 
set forth by the Supreme Court in regards to forcible medication.7  
Finally, Part IV proposes two new means to lessen the negative impact 
on the Sixth Amendment rights of the criminal defendant.8 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Forcible medication of pre-trial detainees, as well as incarcerated and 
mentally ill individuals, has been an issue in American jurisprudence for 
several decades.9  Part II.A discusses the medications often at issue in 
                                                                                                             
antipsychotic medications throughout his trial); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107 
(10th Cir. 2005) (permitting forcible medication of a pre-trial detainee to render him 
competent to stand trial); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (10th Cir. 2005) (denying the 
government’s request to forcibly medicate a pre-trial detainee so that he was competent to 
stand trial); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming a trial court 
decision to forcibly medicate a pre-trial detainee so that he would be competent to stand 
trial); United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999) (reversing an order to forcibly 
medicate a pre-trial detainee). See generally Hollybeth G. Hakes, Annotation, Forcible 
Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to Pre-trial Detainees—Federal Cases, 188 A.L.R. 
FED. 285 (2003) (listing cases where forcible medication of pre-trial detainees was a 
significant factor). 
5 See generally Debra A. Breneman, Recent Development: Forcible Antipsychotic Medication 
and the Unfortunate Side Effects of Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003), 27 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 965 (2004) (discussing the impact of Sell on Sixth Amendment 
rights); Aaron R. Dias,  Just Say Yes: Sell v. United States and Inadequate Limitations of the 
Forced Medication of Defendants in Order to Render Competence for Trial, 55 S.C. L. REV. 517 
(2004) (explaining the impact on First Amendment rights in light of forcible medication); 
Bruce J. Winick, The Right To Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 
44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1989) (providing a comprehensive discussion of forcible mental 
health treatment and the freedom of speech); Scott Ditfurth, Note, When Can the Government 
Force Someone To Be Competent: Sell v. United States, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 667 (2004) 
(criticizing the forcible medication of pre-trial detainees for the purpose of establishing 
competence for trial). 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 See Julie D. Cantor, M.D., Of Pills and Needles: Involuntarily Medicating the Psychotic 
Inmate When Execution Looms, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 119 (2005).  Cantor discusses the 
history of mental illness and the legal system.  Id. at 125-26. 
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cases concerning forcible medication.10  Part II.B explains the rights of 
individuals regarding forcible medical treatment, including private 
citizens, convicted inmates, and pre-trial detainees.11  Then, Part II.C 
discusses the rights implicated by forcibly medicating various persons 
with psychotropic medications.12  Further, Part II.D discusses the 
evolving standards as declared by the Supreme Court regarding the 
issue of forcibly medicating pre-trial detainees with psychotropic 
medications.13  Part II.E presents the application of the standards to 
various cases.14 
A. Antipsychotic or Psychotropic Medications 
Many mental illnesses are treated with medications termed 
antipsychotic or psychotropic and the Supreme Court has distinguished 
the forcible use of these medications from other bodily intrusions to 
which pretrial defendants may be subjected.15  For example, while a 
blood test is considered a routine procedure with little to no lasting side 
effects, the side effects of antipsychotic medications are plentiful and 
much more severe.16 Some side effects that can result from 
“conventional” antipsychotic medications include nervous ticks, spasms, 
restlessness, and a condition called tardive dyskinesia.17  Studies show 
                                                 
10 See infra Part II.A. 
11 See infra Part II.B. 
12 See infra Part II.C. 
13 See infra Part II.D. 
14 See infra Part II.E. 
15 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).  The Court in Schmerber held that 
minor intrusions into a person’s body, such as a blood test, are not forbidden by the 
Constitution under extremely limited circumstances.  Id.  See also John R. Hayes, Sell v. 
United States: Is Competency Enough to Forcibly Medicate a Criminal Defendant?,  94 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 657, 658 (2004). 
16 See Elizabeth G. Schultz, Sell-ing Your Soul to the Courts: Forced Medication To Achieve 
Trial Competency in the Wake of Sell v. United States, 38 AKRON L. REV. 503, 540 (2005) 
(discussing the different side effects produced by typical anti-psychotic medications); see 
also Hayes, supra note 15, at 658-59 (explaining the different side effect possibilities and 
probabilities resulting from the administration of antipsychotic medication); Rebekah W. 
Page, Comment, Forcible Medication and the Fourth Amendment: A New Framework for 
Protecting Nondangerous Mentally Ill Pretrial Detainees Against Unreasonable Governmental 
Intrusions into the Body, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2005) (discussing “cognitive dampening,” 
a side effect that impairs memory, reasoning, and functioning in complex situations). 
17 Hayes, supra note 15, at 658.  The Supreme Court has even recognized that 10-25% of 
people taking anti-psychotic drugs exhibit symptoms of tardive dyskinesia.  Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 230 (1990).  Involuntary movements of muscles, particularly in the 
facial region, characterize tardive dyskinesia.  Id. at 230.  Tardive dyskinesia can also result 
in involuntary sucking movements, grimacing, and involuntary jerking in the limbs.  T. 
Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental 
 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/8
2006] Forcibly Medicating Criminal Defendants 459 
that these side effects occur in up to seventy-five percent of people who 
take these medications and are potentially irreversible.18  In addition to 
these side effects, other possible reactions include sedation, decreased 
ability to concentrate, dry mouth, blurred vision, weakness, and 
dizziness.19  Further, there are some newer, “atypical” medications used 
to treat psychotic disorders that have reduced some of the traditional 
side effects of antipsychotic medications, though they present problems 
of their own.20 
Despite side effects that may manifest as a result of antipsychotic 
medications, these drugs can also produce beneficial effects.21  For 
                                                                                                             
Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 305 (1997).  About 10% 
of people who suffer from this side effect experience it in its “severe” form.  Harper, 494 
U.S. at 230. 
18 Hayes, supra note 15, at 658.  Additionally, the side effects may also be “subjectively 
quite stressful . . . incompatible with clinical improvement and with a useful life outside the 
hospital, and can be more unbearable than the symptoms for which the patient was 
originally treated.”  Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae, Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) [hereinafter APA Brief]. 
19 Hayes, supra note 15, at 658.  Further, conventional psychotropic medications can 
cause Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, a disease that can lead to respiratory and kidney 
failure if left untreated.  APA Brief, supra note 18, at 3.  Further, another side effect is 
akathisia, an emotional condition that causes extreme irritability, a constant desire to be in 
motion, and an adverse effect on the thinking process.  Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just 
Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right To Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 
322 (1992).  In addition, another possible side effect is akinesia, which can cause lethargy 
and cause the patient to feel like he is “dead inside.”  Page, supra note 16, at 1068.  On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, another possible side effect is strong agitation where the 
patient feels “revved up” and unable to remain still.  Id. at 1068-69. 
20 Hayes, supra note 15, at 658-59.  Another serious side effect that can manifest due to 
medication with atypical psychotropics is diabetes that has developed in patients after one 
dosage of the medication.  Page, supra note 16, at 1070.  Additional side effects that manifest 
due to these “atypical” antipsychotic medications include cataracts, decrease in white 
blood cell counts, sedation, seizures, involuntary muscle spasms in the facial region, 
hypotension, and weight gain.  Hayes, supra note 15, at 659.  Additionally, since these 
“atypical” medications have been in use for a relatively short period of time, it is possible 
that long-term side effects may exist but have not yet been discovered.  Id.  Specifically, the 
medication Clozapine, used principally in the treatment of schizophrenia, can result in 
agranulocytosis, a serious condition that causes a dramatic reduction in the amount of 
white blood cells that can, if not treated quickly, result in death.  Robert N. Swidler, Medical 
Innovations and Ethics: A State Government Perspective, 57 ALB. L. REV. 655, 657 n.44 (1994). 
21 Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 837.  However, it is also suggested that the often cited 
benefits of antipsychotic medications are actually overstated.  Laura Ryan, Comment: 
Washington State Prison Procedure for the Forcible Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to 
Prison Inmates Does Not Violate Due Process, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990), 59 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1405 (1991).  However, some scholars believe that it is the side effects 
that are overstated as opposed to the benefits.  John Baker, Tardive Dyskinesia: Reducing 
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example, antipsychotic drugs are very effective in treating symptoms of 
psychoses by clearing delusions that may cause irrational behavior and 
interfere with regular courses of treatment.22  Additionally, antipsychotic 
drugs allow for more humane treatment of those with delusional 
disorders.23 
Regardless of the benefits and detriments, it still remains that the 
very purpose of antipsychotic drugs is to alter the chemistry of the brain 
to produce beneficial changes in the cognitive process.24  While there 
may be some benefit to the administration of these antipsychotic 
medicines, the medicines often produce serious, even fatal, side effects.25  
As a result, the use of these medications presents constitutional 
difficulties when considering the rights implicated by the practice of 
forcibly medicating individuals.26   
B. Forcible Medical Treatment in General 
Generally, individuals possess certain rights regarding their medical 
care.27  These rights are balanced against relevant government interests, 
depending on whether the person is a private citizen, a convicted 
prisoner, or pre-trial detainee.28  However, pre-trial detainees are 
                                                                                                             
Medical Malpractice Exposure Through a Risk-Benefit Analysis, 1 DEPAUL HEALTH CARE L. 799, 
801 (1997). 
22 Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 837.  Specifically, administration of Clozapine, a drug 
used for treating schizophrenia, has resulted in substantial improvements in patients who 
have not reacted to other antipsychotic medications by reducing hallucinations, disjointed 
thinking, and bizarre behavior.  Swidler, supra note 20, at 667.  Some patients have made 
such remarkable recoveries while using Clozapine that they are now able to live 
independently.  Id. at 667 n.41.  Additionally, Clozapine has reduced symptoms of tardive 
dyskinesia in patients who were previously administered conventional antipsychotic 
medications.  Id. at 667. 
23 Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 837.  Antipsychotic medications, by relieving the 
symptoms of psychoses, allow a patient to be free of restraints and makes it possible for the 
patient to eventually function in society.  Id. at 837-38.  Ziegelmueller also notes that the 
benefits and side effects vary dramatically depending on the dosage of the medication.  Id. 
24 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (citing Harper v. Washington, 759 P.2d 
358, 361 n.3 (Wash. 1988)). 
25 Id. at 230.  The Court further discussed other side effects caused by antipsychotic 
drugs in general.  Id. at 229.  For example, these drugs can produce an effect called acute 
dystonia which causes severe involuntary spasms of the upper body, throat, tongue, or 
eyes, and causes the necessity to introduce another drug to combat these effects.  Id. at 229-
30. 
26 See infra Part II.C. 
27 See infra Part II.B.1. 
28 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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considered under different standards than convicted prisoners and 
private detainees when the issue of forcible medication arises.29 
1. Rights of Patients 
The Supreme Court has held that people have the right to decide 
what types of medical treatment they wish to receive and the ability to 
refuse such recommended treatment.30  In Cruzan v. Missouri Department 
of Health,31 the Court held that competent people generally have the right 
to exact control over their own bodies, and one who ignores those wishes 
can be held liable.32  While Cruzan stands for the proposition that a 
competent person generally has the right to refuse medical treatment, an 
incompetent person does not enjoy the same right.33  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
29 See infra Part II.B.3. 
30 Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).  In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan was 
in an automobile accident and sustained injuries leaving her incompetent.  Id. at 265.  Her 
parents, serving as her guardians, after learning that their daughter would likely never 
regain consciousness or cognitive functions, sought to have the feeding and hydration 
tubes removed from their daughter.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Missouri declined to allow 
the withdrawal, holding that because there was no clear and convincing evidence that 
Nancy Cruzan would have requested that the feeding and hydration tubes be withdrawn, 
her parents had no authority to carry out their request.  Id. 
31 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
32 Id. at 269 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).  
Justice Cardozo stated, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in 
damages.”  Id. 
33 Id.  (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). The Court stated 
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than 
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”  Id.  
The focus of Cruzan was whether it was constitutionally permissible for the State of 
Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent person would have 
desired the cessation of life-sustaining treatment.  Id.  The Court held that while a 
competent person generally possesses the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, 
it does not follow that an incompetent person should have the same right as one who is 
competent to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise the right.  Id. at 278-80.  
Courts have, however, found that involuntarily committed mental patients have the right 
to refuse anti-psychotic drugs.  Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 840 (3d Cir. 1981).  In Rennie, 
the petitioner was a frequent patient at a New Jersey state-run psychiatric hospital.  Id. at 
838.  He was forcibly medicated with anti-psychotic drugs and filed suit alleging that 
several specific rights had been violated by the forced medication: the right to refuse 
treatment in non-emergency situations; the right to receive treatment; the right of access to 
counsel; and the right to be free from abuse while in state custody.  Id. at 839.  The lower 
court found that involuntarily as well as voluntarily committed individuals have a right to 
refuse anti-psychotic medications.  Id. at 840.  See also Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. 
Mass. 1979).  In Okin, the court prevented the forcible medication of antipsychotic 
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Court in Cruzan acknowledged that the idea of bodily integrity is the 
reason that informed consent is generally necessary before medical 
treatment commences.34  The Court then explained that a logical 
companion to the idea of informed consent is the right to refuse 
treatment.35 
Courts have also considered the rights of those in a mental 
institution to refuse treatment, initially granting institutional authorities 
the right to supervise and regulate the treatment regimen for those 
committed involuntarily.36  However, a federal district court has held 
that patients who have been involuntarily committed to mental 
institutions also enjoy the right to refuse medication.37  In cases 
considering forcible medication in mental facilities, antipsychotic or 
psychotropic drugs are most often at issue.38  The nature of the 
antipsychotic drugs themselves is often cited as the objection to 
accepting the drugs voluntarily.39  Nonetheless, courts have recognized 
                                                                                                             
medications to involuntarily committed individuals holding that, “Whatever powers the 
Constitution has granted our government, involuntary mind control is not one of them, 
absent extraordinary circumstances.”  Id. at 1367. 
34 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269; see also G. Steven Neely, The Constitutional Right to Suicide, the 
Quality of Life, and the “Slippery Slope”: An Explicit Reply to Lingering Concerns, 28 AKRON L. 
REV. 53, 54 (1994) (discussing the long-standing recognition by the common law of the right 
for a person to be free from non-consensual bodily intrusions and the extension of that 
recognition to the refusal of life-saving treatment). 
35 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.  Informed consent encompasses the right to choose, accept, or 
refuse medical treatment.  Cantor, supra note 9, at 127.  However, the rights of bodily 
integrity and personal autonomy that form the basis of the informed consent doctrine are 
not absolute.  Id. at 127-28.  A few limited situations have been identified where informed 
consent is not required, such as in emergency situations where a patient may be 
unconscious or delirious and a delay in treatment would jeopardize her health.  Id. at 128.  
When a doctor decides that certain information may cause severe distress to a patient, she 
may also withhold decision-making information.  Id. 
36 Schultz, supra note 16, at 511 n.48.  However, the practice of allowing institutional 
authorities to have discretion over the treatment regimen began to erode in the mid-
twentieth century when mental health issues became more prevalent in the United States.  
Jessica Litman, Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized 
Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1720, 1725 (1982).  Issues such as involuntary commitment, 
patient rights, and institutional conditions were litigated.  Schultz, supra note 16, at 511 
n.49. 
37 See Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342. 
38 Cichon, supra note 19, at 286 n.14.  The most common form of treatment in mental 
facilities is the administration of antipsychotic medications, both for patients diagnosed as 
schizophrenics and those who are not.  Litman, supra note 36, at 1725. 
39 William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of Protection for 
Psychiatric Patients To Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 938 (1998).  “[B]oth the legal and 
medical professions recognize that psychotropic medication in general, and antipsychotic 
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the rights of both those who are incompetent due to mental illness and 
those incapacitated by physical injuries to refuse treatment.40 
2. Rights of Patients in Light of Government Interests 
While the Cruzan decision discussed the right to refuse medical 
treatment, the Court’s primary focus was on the right to refuse life 
sustaining treatment.41  However, even in other contexts, courts have 
found that competent persons have the right to refuse medical treatment 
despite the government’s interest in the treatment taking place.42  
In Winston v. Lee,43 the Supreme Court held that despite the 
government’s interest in prosecuting an alleged offender, the 
government could not compel the suspect to undergo a surgical 
procedure to remove a bullet from his chest that could provide 
exculpatory evidence.44  The Court distinguished Winston from Schmerber 
                                                                                                             
medication in particular, often produce side effects ranging in nature from short-term and 
merely discomforting to permanent and life-threatening.”  Id. 
40 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that the Court has recognized the 
right to refuse treatment for those incapacitated by physical injury, such as in Cruzan, as 
well as those who are incapacitated by a mental impairment, as in both Rennie and Okin). 
41 Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 287 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).  The Court found that 
Missouri has an important interest in preserving the life of its citizens.  Id. at 280.  The 
Court further held that since the choice between life and death is such a personal and final 
decision, Missouri has an interest in safeguarding the personal nature of this choice by 
requiring the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence when a 
personal representative or guardian seeks to render that decision over the incompetent 
person.  Id. at 281. 
42 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).  The Court balanced the government’s interest 
in obtaining evidence in a criminal investigation with the right of an individual to be free 
from bodily intrusions.  Id. at 766.  See infra notes 43-44, 47-48. 
43 470 U.S. 753 (1985).  In Winston, Lee was charged with attempted robbery and other 
related charges resulting from an alleged attempt to rob a store where the shopkeeper was 
wounded during the robbery.  Id. at 755.  During the altercation, the shopkeeper, 
Watkinson, fired a shot at one of the perpetrators who retreated from the scene with an 
apparent wound in his left side.  Id.  Police later responded to a call from Lee who was 
wounded by gunshot on the left side of his chest.  Id. at 756.  Lee claimed that persons 
attempting to rob him shot him; however, while in the emergency room. Watkinson 
identified Lee as the man who attempted to rob his store.  Id.  After an investigation, the 
police determined that Lee was the person who attempted to rob Watkinson and he was 
subsequently charged.  Id. 
44 Id. at 755.  The bullet that the government wanted removed from Lee’s chest was 
approximately one inch beneath the surface of the skin and would require general 
anesthesia, despite earlier indications that the wound was more superficial.  Id. at 757.  An 
earlier motion to compel the surgery was granted by a lower court judge because the 
surgeon testified that only a local anesthetic would be necessary and the dangers would be 
minimal.  Id. at 756. 
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v. California,45 in which the Court allowed an unwilling person under 
suspicion of drunk driving to undergo a blood test.46  In contrast, the 
Court in Winston found that the surgical procedure that the defendant 
would have to undergo to extract the bullet would be a substantial 
intrusion into his person and would constitute an unreasonable search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.47  As a result, the Court 
concluded that surgical intrusions implicate privacy expectations that 
may be considered unreasonable, despite producing evidence of a 
crime.48 
Other important government interests are implicated regarding 
issues of forcible medication, such as maintaining a secure and orderly 
prison environment.49  In Washington v. Harper,50 the Supreme Court 
found that the proper standard for determining if a prison regulation 
infringes on the constitutional rights of an inmate is whether the 
regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” 
even if the alleged infringed-upon right is fundamental and would 
ordinarily require a higher standard of review.51  The Court reviewed the 
                                                 
45 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that a State may, over the suspect’s protest, have a 
physician extract blood from a person suspected of drunken driving without violation of 
the suspect’s rights secured by the Fourth Amendment not to be subjected to unreasonable 
searches and seizures.). 
46 Id. at 772 (finding that minor intrusions into a person’s body under extremely limited 
conditions are not forbidden by the Constitution).  In Schmerber, the petitioner and his 
companion, after leaving a bowling alley where they had been drinking, skidded across the 
road and hit a tree shortly after midnight.  Id. at  759 n.2.  The petitioner was then taken to 
the hospital for treatment when an officer directed the blood test so that the petitioner’s 
blood alcohol level could be tested.  Id. at 759. 
47 Winston, 470 U.S. at 767.  The Court considered the extent that the procedure could 
threaten Lee’s health and safety.  Id. at 761.  The Court contrasted the routine blood test 
that was in dispute in Schmerber to the procedure that Lee would need to undergo so that 
the State could retrieve the bullet.  Id. at 761, 764.  Lee’s procedure would entail general 
anesthesia, extensive probing of his muscle tissue that carried “the concomitant risks of 
injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood vessels and other tissue in the 
chest and pleural cavity.” Id. at 764 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 
1984)). 
48 Id. at 759.  “A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence . . . 
implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may 
be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”  Id. 
49 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990); see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (finding that “prison regulations . . . are judged under a 
‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of 
fundamental constitutional rights”). 
50 494 U.S. 210. 
51 Id. at 223.  In Harper, Walter Harper was incarcerated for robbery in 1976 and was 
housed for the greater part of 1976-1980 in the mental health ward at Washington State 
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policy of the state with regard to forcibly medicating prisoners with anti-
psychotic medication and found that the safeguards in place and the 
important penological interests served allowed for the forcible 
medication of that prisoner.52   
3. Pre-trial Detainees 
While courts have articulated certain standards for forcibly 
medicating convicted prisoners, courts have articulated different 
standards for those detained pending trial.53  In Riggins v. Nevada,54 the 
                                                                                                             
Penitentiary.  Id. at 213.  During this time, he consented to the administration of anti-
psychotic drugs.  Id.  He was paroled in 1980 and, after violating parole by assaulting two 
nurses at a hospital, he was returned to a Special Offender Center that was established to 
treat and diagnose felons with serious mental disorders.  Id.  After first consenting to being 
medicated, he later refused to take anti-psychotic medications.  Id.  His treating physician 
then sought to forcibly medicate Harper pursuant to the Special Offender Center Policy.  Id. 
52 Id. at 227.  The Court qualified its ruling by determining that the forcible medication of 
the prisoner was constitutionally permissible only when the inmate was “dangerous to 
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”  Id.  Furthermore, 
the Court noted that forcibly medicating this prisoner was consistent with the Due Process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was reasonably related to ensuring 
that the personnel and staff of the prison facility remained safe and secure and that the 
regulations in place were a rational method by which to achieve the goal.  Id.  The Court 
further explored the procedural requirements that are necessary to compel medication and 
found that the procedures that the Special Offender Center had in place were sufficient.  Id. 
at 228.  The procedures in place included a hearing that allowed for the medication only if 
the prisoner was determined to suffer from a mental disorder and posed a danger to the 
safety of himself or others, administration only by a psychiatrist, notice requirements, and 
periodic review.  Id. at 215-16. 
53 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (holding that Nevada could have satisfied 
Due Process requirements had it made a finding that treatment with an anti-psychotic 
medication of the pre-trial detainee was medically appropriate and essential when other 
less intrusive alternatives were explored or by establishing that Nevada could not 
adjudicate the defendant by using any other less intrusive means); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (“[P]retrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, 
retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted 
prisoners.”). 
54 504 U.S. 127 (1992).  In Riggins, David Riggins challenged his conviction for murder 
and robbery because he was forcibly medicated with the anti-psychotic drug Mellaril 
during his trial.  Id. at 129.  Riggins was convicted of stabbing Paul Wade to death in his 
Las Vegas apartment.  Id.  A few days after his arrest, he conveyed to the county’s 
psychiatrist that he heard voices in his head and had some difficulty sleeping.  Id.  His 
psychiatrist prescribed Mellaril to Riggins in increasing doses as he continued to complain 
of his symptoms.  Id.  A court found Riggins competent to stand trial while under the 
effects of the medication.  Id. at 130.  Riggins then moved for the suspension of the 
medication while he was on trial arguing that the effects of the drugs compromised his 
right to a fair trial.  Id.  With no rationale provided, the district court denied Riggins’s 
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Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment provides at least as 
much protection to a pre-trial detainee as to one already convicted of a 
crime.55  The Court alluded to methods by which a state could justify the 
forcible medication of a pre-trial detainee, such as the state proffering the 
justification that adjudication could not occur without the medication.56  
Additionally, the Court asserted that any trial prejudice that may occur 
because of the medication may be outweighed by the need to accomplish 
an essential state policy.57 
Further, the government may propose other justifications, such as 
dangerousness to oneself or others, for forcibly medicating a pre-trial 
detainee with antipsychotic medications.58  In Sell v. United States,59 the 
                                                                                                             
motion, thereby compelling him to continue taking the medication.  Id. at 131.  Riggins was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.  Id. 
55 Id. at 135.  The Court cited to its holding in Harper that it is impermissible to forcibly 
medicate a prisoner with an antipsychotic medication unless there is an important 
justification and a finding that the forced medication is medically appropriate.  Id.  
Additionally, because a pre-trial detainee awaits trial and has not yet been convicted of any 
crime, the pre-trial detainee has a greater interest at stake than a person who has already 
been convicted because the detainee will be adversely affected by any act that could 
influence the fairness of a trial.  Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 844. 
56 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. The Court then cited to Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion 
in Illinois v. Allen, stating that “Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is 
fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and prerequisite to social justice and peace.”  
Id. at 136 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
57 Id. at 135 (“Nevada certainly would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had 
demonstrated, and the District Court had found, that treatment with antipsychotic 
medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential 
for the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”).  However, Justice Kennedy 
pointed out in his concurrence that “absent an extraordinary showing by the State, the Due 
Process Clause prohibits prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses of 
antipsychotic medicines for purposes of rendering the accused competent for trial.”  Id. at 
139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy further explained that he doubted that in 
most cases a proper showing could be made to justify forcibly medicating a pre-trial 
detainee with antipsychotic medication under the present understanding of the drugs 
themselves.  Id. 
58 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003).  For example, the Court indicated 
that dangerousness is an appropriate factor to consider in determining if forcible 
medication is appropriate.  Id.  The Court also suggested that civil commitment may 
provide another alternative.  Id. 
59 Id.  In Sell, Dr. Charles Sell, a dentist with a long history of mental illness, was charged 
in 1997 with mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laundering.  Id. at 169-70.  After a 
psychiatric evaluation, Sell was found competent at the time with the Federal Magistrate, 
but the evaluation noted that Sell might suffer a psychotic break in the future.  Id. at 170.  
While Sell was free on bail, the Government alleged that he attempted to intimidate a 
witness.  Id.  At the bail revocation hearing, Sell’s mental condition had indeed worsened 
and was manifested by such behavior as spitting in the judge’s face, using racial epithets, 
and personal insults.  Id.  Sell’s bail was revoked and he was subsequently found 
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Supreme Court explained that if forced medication is necessary for 
purposes related to the individual’s dangerousness or a possible risk to 
her own health, then the forcible medication can be justified without 
relying on the trial competence justification.60  The Court explained that 
the facts of each individual case must be examined in evaluating the 
government’s interest in forcibly medicating a pre-trial detainee as 
special circumstances may lessen the importance of the government’s 
interest.61 
C.  Rights Implicated by Forcibly Medicating a Pre-Trial Detainee 
Because courts have distinguished the standards for forcible 
medication of pretrial detainees from convicted prisoners, it follows that 
different rights are implicated as well.62  Though the Sixth Amendment is 
the focus of this Note, many other rights are implicated as well.63  
                                                                                                             
incompetent to stand trial.  Id. at 171.  He was hospitalized for evaluation, where it was 
recommended that Sell take antipsychotic medications, which he refused.  Id. 
60 Id. at 182.  “If a court authorizes medication on these alternative grounds, the need to 
consider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear.”  Id. at 183. 
61 Id. at 180.  For example, the Court cited to how a defendant’s refusal to voluntarily 
take antipsychotic medications may result in lengthy commitment to a mental health 
facility, thereby diminishing the risk that an alleged criminal will go free without 
punishment.  Id.  The Court also pointed out that while the government has an interest in 
prosecuting defendants, it also has an interest in assuring that the defendant receives a fair 
trial.  Id. 
62 See supra Part II.B. 
63 The scope of rights that are affected by forcible medication is broad.  See generally 
Aaron M. Nance, Comment, Balking at Buying What the Eighth Circuit Is Sell-Ing: United 
States v. Sell and the Involuntary Medication of Incompetent, Non-Dangerous, Pretrial Detainees 
Cloaked with the Presumption of Innocence, 71 UMKC L. REV. 685, 687 (2003).  The First 
Amendment is implicated as the side effects of the medication can hamper the 
communicative abilities of the medicated individual.  See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 229 (1990) (antipsychotic drugs have the capacity to severely and even permanently 
affect an individual’s ability to think and communicate).  For an in-depth discussion of 
forcible medication and the First Amendment, see Winick, supra note 5.  Constitutional 
scholars believe that by seeking to alter the way a person thinks, the government is seeking 
to control the person’s thought process and therefore communicative abilities when the 
government forces doses of antipsychotic medications on a person.  Schultz, supra note 16, 
at 533; see also Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that forcibly 
medicating a pre-trial detainee would affect the detainee’s ability to produce ideas and, 
therefore, affect the detainee’s freedom of speech).  Additionally, the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is implicated by forcible medication 
because it is more than a minor intrusion into the body.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S 388, 392 (1971) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment “guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority”); Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (holding that “the Constitution does not forbid the 
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States minor intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no 
way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other 
conditions”).  In addition to the First and Fourth Amendment implications, the Court has 
explicitly held that the substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment are also 
implicated by forcible medication.   Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992).  The Court 
has found a liberty interest in declining antipsychotic medication due to the side effects 
and function.  Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment substantively protects a person’s right to be free from 
unjustified intrusions into the body, to refuse medical treatment, and to be informed so as 
to be able to sufficiently make a decision regarding any bodily intrusion).  Additionally, 
procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment is also implicated by forcible 
medication.  Hakes, supra note 4, at 290.  Concerns important as to whether procedural due 
process has been fulfilled include administrative hearings, notice, and an articulation of 
specific reasons for medicating a detainee.  United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 305 (4th 
Cir. 1988).  Four specific factors crucial in determining whether due process has been 
satisfied are: (1) the private individual’s interests; (2) the government’s interests; (3) the 
value of the suggested procedural requirements; and (4) the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of rights to the individual present in the current procedures.  United States v. Brandon, 158 
F.3d 947, 953 (6th Cir. 1998).  In Brandon, the Sixth Circuit relied on adherence to the 
extensive safeguards provided under 28 C.F.R. § 549.43.  Id. at 953.  The code requires: 
(1) 24 hour advanced written notice of the time, date, place and 
purpose of the hearing, with the reasons for the proposed medication; 
(2) Notice of the right to appear at the hearing, present evidence, and 
be represented by a staff member; 
(3) The hearing is to be conducted by a psychiatrist not currently 
involved in the diagnosis or treatment of the individual; 
(4) The medical professional treating or evaluating the individual 
must attend the hearing and present clinical data and background 
information in support of the need for medication; 
(5) The psychiatrist conducting the hearing will determine and 
prepare a written report regarding whether such medication is 
necessary in the effort of restoring the individual’s competence, or 
because the individual is dangerous, gravely disabled, or unable to 
function in his housing facility; 
(6) Inmates are given a copy of the report and notified of their right 
to appeal the determination to the administrator of the mental health 
division in the institution within 24 hours of the decision; 
(7) No medication will be administered until resolution of the 
appeal; 
(8) A non-attending psychiatrist must monitor the individual’s 
treatment at least once every 30 days and document the same; and 
(9) Only in emergency situations may an individual be medicated 
prior to a hearing; or while an appeal is pending.  During an 
emergency, an individual may be forcibly medicated only when doing 
so is an ‘appropriate treatment’ and no less restrictive means are 
available. 
28 C.F.R. § 549.43 (1998); see also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (articulating 
the procedural safeguards and interests that must be considered).  Finally, another right, 
considered fundamental though not expressly articulated in the Constitution, implicated 
by forcible medication is the right to privacy.  Schultz, supra note 16, at 534 n.170.  The 
 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/8
2006] Forcibly Medicating Criminal Defendants 469 
Accordingly, this section discusses the impact of forcible medication on 
Sixth Amendment rights.64 
The Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, is 
implicated when defendants are forcibly medicated.65  In fact, the 
Supreme Court has discussed how the forcible medication of a pre-trial 
detainee can violate a detainee’s right to a fair trial under the Sixth 
Amendment.66  In his concurrence in Riggins v. United States, Justice 
Kennedy compared the administration of these drugs to concerns of the 
prosecution manipulating evidence.67  The possibility that the side effects 
of the medication may alter the demeanor of the defendant was 
troublesome to the Court.68  The drugs are thought to prejudice the 
defendant in two main ways:  (1) by altering his or her demeanor so that 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court has held that a person, under the right to privacy, has a protected liberty 
interest in refusing antipsychotic medication.  Washington v. Harper, 594 U.S. 210, 229 
(1990). 
64 See infra Part II.C. 
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Id. 
66 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (ruling that it was error to order the 
detainee to be administered antipsychotic drugs during the course of the trial).  “[T]he 
concerns are much the same as if it were alleged that the prosecution had manipulated 
material evidence.”  Id. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
67 Id. at 139.  Justice Kennedy further explained that in order for these sorts of forcible 
medications to meet the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, the government must show 
that “there is no significant risk that the medication will impair or alter in any material way 
the defendant’s capacity or willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to assist his 
counsel.”  Id. at 141. 
68 Id. at 142.  Justice Kennedy discussed extensively how the antipsychotic drugs can 
prejudice the defendant by altering his demeanor.  Id. at 142-43.  A brief from the American 
Psychiatric Association alleged that the amount of medication that Riggins was dosed with 
could have affected Riggins’s thought process.  Vickie L. Feeman, Note, Reassessing Forced 
Medication of Criminal Defendants in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 35 B.C. L. REV. 681, 688 
(1994).  The Court also heard psychiatric testimony that indicated that under this 
medication, Riggins was also likely to suffer from confusion.  Id.  Because of these reasons, 
the Court concluded that it was possible that not only was Riggins’s testimony impacted, 
but also that he was unable to effectively communicate with his attorney.  Id. 
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his or her appearance and reactions in the courtroom are affected; and (2) 
by affecting his or her ability to provide assistance to counsel.69 
First, the Court recognized that the side effects of antipsychotic 
drugs could alter the outward appearance and the reactions of the 
defendant.70  Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence that while the 
jury could interpret the manifestation of these side effects in many ways, 
the side effects have the propensity to create a negative impression.71  
Additionally, Justice Kennedy remarked that the physical effects of 
medication may prejudice the jury against the defendant.72  This notion 
was supported in Willis v. Cockrell,73 in which a Texas court reversed the 
                                                 
69 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142.  “[S]ide effects [of drugs], it appears, can compromise the right 
of a medicated criminal defendant to receive a fair trial. The drugs can prejudice the 
accused in two principal ways: (1) by altering his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice 
his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2) by rendering him unable or 
unwilling to assist counsel.”  Id. 
70 Id.  Justice Kennedy explained the side effects of the drug Mellaril, the drug that this 
particular defendant was administered.  Id.  “The drugs can induce a condition called 
parkinsonism, which . . . is characterized by tremor of the limbs, diminished range of facial 
expression, or slowed functions, such as speech.”  Id.  Justice Kennedy cited to testimony of 
a doctor at the trial who listed the possible side effects as “[d]rowsiness, constipation, 
perhaps lack of alertness, changes in blood pressure. . . .  Depression of the psychomotor 
functions.”  Id. at 143.  The doctor also stated “[i]f you take a lot of it you become stoned for 
all practical purposes and can barely function.”  Id.  (internal citations omitted).  Further, 
studies indicate that the appearance of a medicated defendant does influence the jury.  
Daniel Abraham, Riggins Protects the Insanity Defendant, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 131, 132 
(2000). 
71 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142.  “As any trial attorney will attest, serious prejudice could 
result if medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity to react and respond to the 
proceedings and to demonstrate remorse or compassion.”  Id. at 143-44.  Justice Kennedy 
further explained how this altered demeanor could be most influential during the 
sentencing phase where the trier of fact is attempting to know what was in the mind of the 
defendant and make a judgment about his character, if he has remorse, or if he may be 
dangerous in the future.  Id. at 144.  In addition, studies also indicate that behavior such as 
passivity, agitation, restlessness, or emotionlessness can impact the severity of the sentence 
imposed by the jury during the penalty phase of the trial.  Abraham, supra note 70, at 132-
33.  A notable example of a defendant’s outward appearance affecting the jury’s 
deliberations and verdict was the case of Scott Peterson, who was not medicated, but 
whose lack of emotion influenced the jury and ultimately led to a death sentence.  MSNBC, 
Jurors: Peterson’s Stoicism was the Final Straw (Dec. 14, 2004), http://msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/6711259 (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Peterson’s Stoicism]. 
72 Schultz, supra note 16, at 539; see also APA Brief, supra note 18, at 3.  “[B]ecause 
antipsychotic drugs may affect a defendant’s courtroom demeanor and ability to 
communicate with his attorney, forcible medication may implicate his . . . Sixth 
Amendment trial rights.”  Id. 
73 Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950 (W.D. Tex.  Aug. 9, 
2004).  In Willis, the defendant was charged with murder in the course of committing arson.  
Id. at *3.  The defendant maintained that he was asleep on the couch and was awakened by 
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conviction of a defendant partially due to his demeanor while forcibly 
medicated.74  The Willis Court noted the importance of the demeanor of 
the defendant during the trial and how these drugs affected his 
courtroom presence;75 in fact, the prosecution had used the defendant’s 
emotionless demeanor in its summation to influence the jury’s 
determination of guilt.76  Similarly, the Court in Sell also found that the 
consideration of whether to medicate a pre-trial detainee requires a 
balance of the possible prejudice against the defendant with the interest 
that the government has in adjudicating an alleged offender.77 
Another danger posed by these side effects, also recognized in 
Riggins, is that the defendant will be unable to assist his counsel in 
preparing the defense.78  Specifically, the Supreme Court has stated that 
a defendant must be able to communicate with his lawyer to provide the 
attorney with needed information and must be able to make decisions on 
his own behalf.79  However, the known side effects of these anti-
                                                                                                             
the smell of smoke in the house; two of the four persons in the house escaped the fire, but 
Willis was eventually charged with the murder of one of the occupants who succumbed to 
smoke inhalation as the result of the blaze.  Id. 
74 Id. at *148.  The court granted the defendant’s habeas corpus petition on several 
grounds, including that he was forcibly medicated without the Sell standard being met, the 
prosecution’s suppression of key evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel at both the 
guilt-innocence phase as well as the sentencing phase.  Id. 
75 Id.  The court noted that the medication affected his demeanor in making him appear 
“flat” or unemotional at the proceedings.  Id.  The court found that the side effects actually 
prejudiced the defendant because of their alteration of his demeanor.  Id. 
76 Id.  In this case, the prosecution pointed out how unemotional the defendant acted 
during the trial in order to bolster its case against the defendant.  Id. 
77 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).  The Court in Sell pointed out that the 
government interests in these cases are two-fold.  Id.  The government has a substantial 
interest in prosecuting alleged offenders in a timely fashion as it may be problematic to 
attempt to prosecute an offender years after the alleged offense occurs if he gains 
competence again because evidence may be lost or memories of witnesses may fade.  Id. at 
180.  The government also, however, has an interest in assuring that a defendant receives a 
fair trial.  Id. at 180.  See also United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998).  
“[T]he district court needs to consider the risks that forced medication poses to a pretrial 
detainee . . . because a drug that negatively affects his demeanor in court . . . will not satisfy 
the government’s goal of a fair trial.”  Id. 
78 Brandon, 158 F.3d at 960 (stating that a drug that negatively affects the defendant’s 
capacity to assist in his own trial does not satisfy the government’s goal of a fair trial); see 
also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We have held 
that a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is impaired when he cannot 
cooperate in an active manner with his lawyer.”). 
79 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “The side effects of antipsychotic drugs 
can hamper the attorney-client relation, preventing effective communication and rendering 
the defendant less able or willing to take part in his defense.  The State interferes with this 
relation when it administers a drug to dull cognition.”  Id. 
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psychotic medications have the potential to affect the way in which the 
defendant communicates with his attorney.80  Justice Kennedy 
articulated that when the government forcibly medicates a pre-trial 
detainee with antipsychotic medications, there is the risk that this 
administration will interfere with the defendant’s ability to interact with 
his counsel, and therefore will violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights.81  According to Justice Kennedy, though the Government has an 
interest in trying defendants, it also must consider its interest in assuring 
that a defendant receives a fair trial.82 
Currently, there are two main approaches utilized to attempt to cure 
the Sixth Amendment problems created by the forcible medication of 
pre-trial detainees.  First, the testimonies of experts and the defendant’s 
treating psychiatrists are utilized to attempt to convey to the jury the 
demeanor of the defendant before she was medicated.83  This method 
provides an aural representation to the jury of a condition that is clearly 
visual.84 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 145.  Justice Kennedy asserted that in order to maintain the integrity of the trial 
process, if a defendant cannot be tried without involuntarily medicating him so that his 
demeanor and behavior is affected, then the defendant should be civilly committed unless 
the defendant becomes competent through other means.  Id. 
83 Id. at 148 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas explained how the lower court 
offered Riggins the opportunity to prove his psychiatric condition through testimony 
rather than by allowing the jury to see Riggins in an unmedicated state.  Id.  Riggins did so 
by presenting evidence as to his medication, the possible side effects and how they would 
have affected his demeanor, and what his mental state likely was at the time of the crime 
when he was unmedicated.  Id.  However, he was subsequently convicted.  Id.  Other 
jurisdictions have also provided that the testimony of an expert may suffice to clarify any 
side effects that an anti-psychotic drug may have on the demeanor of a defendant.  See 
New Mexico v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300 (N.M. 1976); South Carolina v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 
302, 306 (S.C. 1978).  Cf.  In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt. 1975) (reversing a conviction 
because the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence regarding the 
effects of an antipsychotic drug on his demeanor). 
84 Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency To Stand Trial in 
Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1135 (1986).  
Expert testimony is an inadequate way to allow for the jury to comprehend the effects of 
medication on the defendant.  Id.  This sort of testimony results in a “battle of the experts” 
with the prosecution arguing that the defendant is only minimally dosed, and the defense 
arguing that the defendant is dosed so much that his cognitive abilities have been 
distorted.  Id.  “[T]he only way for the jury to accurately assess the defendant’s mental state 
when unmedicated is to permit him to stand trial in that condition.”  Id. 
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The second curative attempt is the utilization of jury instructions.85  
In United States v. Charters,86 the Fourth Circuit noted that some courts 
believe that jury instructions are able to cure any effects on the jury that 
the defendant’s demeanor might cause when he is forcibly medicated.87  
Yet the court also noted that the demeanor of the defendant can be very 
influential and may not be able to be effectively cured by a jury 
instruction.88  
D. Evolving Standards 
To protect fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has developed 
standards for determining when forcible medication with antipsychotic 
drugs is permissible.89  The Court first considered the forcible medication 
                                                 
85 Abraham, supra note 70, at 138.  See Michigan v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1984) (implying that jury instructions should be implemented to cure the 
prejudice the jury may develop as the result of the altered demeanor of a defendant 
subjected to antipsychotic medication). 
86 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), reh’g en banc, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988).  In Charters, the 
Appellant Charters was indicted for threatening the President of the United States.  United 
States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 304 (4th Cir. 1988).  Charters was subsequently ordered to 
undergo a psychiatric evaluation and was adjudged incompetent to stand trial.  Id.  Per the 
court’s order, he was detained at a psychiatric facility and regular reports regarding his 
status were made to ascertain if he had regained competency.  Id.  After first refusing the 
government’s request to forcibly medicate Charters with antipsychotic medications, the 
district court held a hearing where testimony revealed that Charters was suffering from 
degenerative schizophrenia, an incurable ailment with symptoms that could be controlled 
via medication.  Id.  His treating psychiatrist testified that he would require indefinite 
confinement if not treated with the proposed medications and that his condition could 
improve, even to the point where he could return to society, if he was subjected to this 
medicinal regimen.  Id. at 304-05.  The district court ordered the medication but, on appeal, 
the decision was reversed stating, “Charters could not be subjected forcibly to the 
prescribed medication without a more elaborate procedural protection.”  Id. at 305. 
87 Charters, 829 F.2d at 494 n.20.  “It has been argued that the problem of a medicated 
defendant can be cured by an instruction to the jury.”  Id.  See Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d at 797 
(stating that informing the jury of the medicated state of the defendant is an adequate 
safeguard for protecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights). 
88 Id.  “[T]he crucial and powerful evidence of the defendant’s demeanor may not be 
sufficiently erased by a curative instruction.”  Id.  “Cautionary instructions are notoriously 
insufficient to protect a defendant against the damaging impact of inadmissible evidence.”  
Fentiman, supra note 84, at 1134. “The naïve assumption that prejudicial effects can be 
overcome by instructions to the jury, . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigating 
fiction.”  Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949). 
89 See generally Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (presenting standards for forcibly 
medicating pre-trial detainees for the purpose of rendering them competent for trial); 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (announcing standards for forcibly medicating pre-
trial detainees); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (articulating standards for when 
it is appropriate to forcible medicate convicted prisoners). 
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of antipsychotic drugs in the context of prisoners in Washington v. 
Harper,90 which laid the groundwork for cases involving pre-trial 
detainees.91  In Harper, the Court decided that the Due Process Clause 
allows the government to forcibly medicate an inmate who has a serious 
mental illness if the inmate is found to be dangerous to himself or others 
and the treatment is in the best medical interest of the inmate.92  Notable 
in Harper is the Court’s holding that an individual has a “significant 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs.”93  Nonetheless, the Court 
ultimately decided that the interest of the government was also 
legitimate and important, and that the regulation that allowed forcibly 
medicating the prisoner was a permissible compromise to reduce the 
dangerousness that the inmate may pose to himself and others.94 
Relying on Harper in many respects, the Court next considered the 
permissibility of forcibly medicating a pre-trial detainee in Riggins v. 
Nevada.95  The Court relied on Harper, reiterating that a person has a 
liberty interest in desiring to avoid the forcible medication of 
antipsychotic medications.96  Specifically, the Court reasoned that under 
Harper, inmates can be subjected to forcible medication of antipsychotic 
                                                 
90 494 U.S 210 (1990); see supra note 51 for a discussion of the facts of Harper. 
91 Hayes, supra note 15, at 660.  Previous cases involving forcible medication primarily 
focused on individuals forcibly committed to psychiatric facilities.  See Rogers v. Okin, 478 
F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (disallowing the forcible medication of patients involuntarily 
committed to a mental facility). 
92 Hayes, supra note 15, at 660.  The government has a legitimate and important interest 
in maintaining the security of a prison facility.  Id.  The Court considered a Washington 
state policy that authorized forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to mentally ill 
inmates who are gravely disabled or who represent a significant danger to themselves or 
others.  Harper, 494 U.S. at 237. 
93 Hayes, supra note 15, at 660.  However, the Court also pointed out that this interest is 
not absolute but is instead subject to the concerns of the state itself.  Id.  The forcible 
medication of the prisoner was seen as a compromise between the liberty interest of the 
prisoner and the governmental interest in reducing potential danger in its facility.  Id.  The 
Court found that Due Process was satisfied by the regulations as well.  Harper, 494 U.S. at 
236. 
94 Hayes, supra note 15, at 660-61.  The Court analyzed the specific procedures that were 
in place at the facility and when balancing those procedures with the substantial privacy 
right of the inmate to be free from forcible medication, found that the procedures in place 
comported with the requirements of due process, despite the adverse side effect risks 
presented by the medication.  Harper, 494 U.S. at 234. 
95 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
96 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229) (“The forcible injection of 
medication into a nonconsenting person’s body . . . represents a substantial interference 
with that person’s liberty.”).  The Court further explained how severe the interference can 
be with drugs such as Mellaril, the drug with which Riggins was injected.  Id. at 134. 
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medicines only after there is a determination that it is both medically 
appropriate and there is an overriding government justification, and that 
pre-trial detainees are afforded at least as much protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.97  The Riggins Court found that the forced 
medication of a criminal defendant in order to enable him to be 
competent to stand trial may be permissible if the state can establish that 
the treatment was medically appropriate and necessary for safety 
concerns.98 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins further addresses 
government interests with respect to forcibly medicating a criminal 
defendant.99  Furthermore, Justice Kennedy weighed the concomitant 
interests of the government in forcibly medicating a pre-trial detainee.100  
He determined that absent a showing that the forcible medication would 
not hamper the rights of the individual to secure a fair trial, the state 
must instead resort to other means, such as civil commitment, in order to 
preserve some integrity in the trial system.101  Additionally, he expressed 
doubt that the government could ever make a showing that would allow 
for forcible medication of a pre-trial detainee for the purposes of 
competency.102 
                                                 
97 Id. at 135. 
98 Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.  The Court stated: “We hold that, given the requirements of the 
prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who 
has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is 
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”  Id.; 
see also Hayes, supra note 15, at  661. 
99 Hayes, supra note 15, at 662.  Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the government has 
a legitimate interest in restoring competence of those defendants who are not competent to 
stand trial, deriving from the right of the state to bring an accused to trial.  Riggins, 504 U.S. 
at 139.  “Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of 
those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of 
counsel,  the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right 
to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.”  Id. at 139-
40. 
100 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The state has an interest in not only 
bringing a criminal defendant to trial, but also to protect the rights of individuals.  Id. 
101 Id. at 145.  “If the State cannot render the defendant competent without involuntary 
medication, then it must resort to civil commitment . . . unless the defendant becomes 
competent through other means.”  Id.  Justice Kennedy understood that the Constitution 
necessitated that the cost of civil commitment be borne by society so that trial integrity 
remains intact.  Hayes, supra note 15, at 662. 
102 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy stated: 
I file this separate opinion . . . to express my view that absent an 
extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits 
prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses of 
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In 2003, the Supreme Court announced the current standard 
regarding forcibly medicating criminal defendants in Sell v. United 
States.103  In particular, the Court articulated a four-part test for allowing 
forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to pre-trial detainees for 
the purpose of competency and stated that it would only be met in rare 
instances.104  The first Sell factor is that a court must determine that there 
are important governmental interests at stake in prosecuting the alleged 
offender.105  Second, the court must determine that the forcible 
medication will further the important government interests of timely 
prosecution and the interest of ensuring that the defendant receives a fair 
trial.106   
Third, the court must find that medicating the defendant is necessary 
to achieve the government interests.107  The Court determined that in 
making its decision whether it is permissible to forcibly medicate a pre-
trial detainee, a court must consider whether there are any less intrusive 
treatments that may achieve the same result.108  Additionally, before the 
                                                                                                             
antipsychotic medicines for purposes of rendering the accused 
competent for trial, and to express doubt that the showing can be made 
in most cases, given our present understanding of the properties of 
these drugs. 
Id. at 138-39. 
103 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  The Court explained that the seriousness of the crime is a factor in determining the 
importance of the government interest.  Id.  Further, the Court articulated that each 
situation must be determined on the facts of the individual case. Id.  “Special circumstances 
may lessen the importance of that interest.”  Id.  The Court gave as examples that the 
detainee’s refusal to take the antipsychotic medication may lead to a lengthy stay in a 
mental facility and that detention would lessen the government’s interest in prosecution 
because the alleged offender would not be free to commit more crimes.  Id. 
106 Id. at 181.  “It (the court) must find that administration of the drugs is substantially 
likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial.  At the same time, it must find that 
administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere 
significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense, 
thereby rendering the trial unfair.”  Id.  (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
107 Id.  “[T]he court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further 
those interests.”  Id. 
108 Id.  “The court must find that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to 
achieve substantially the same results.”  Id.  The Court cited to amici curiae briefs with 
different views on the alternatives to medication in psychiatric patients—one which claims 
that non-drug therapies may be effective in restoring psychotic patients to a competent 
state while the other suggests that alternative treatments to medication are generally not as 
effective as the medication.  Id. 
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more intrusive forcible medication is effectuated, the court must consider 
a less severe method of medicating the defendant.109 
Finally, before forcibly medicating the pre-trial detainee, a court 
must conclude that the administration of the drugs is medically 
appropriate.110  The Court in Sell explained that it will be necessary to 
consider the specific drugs that the state proposes for administration to 
the pre-trial detainee.111  More specifically, the different side effects 
caused by the different medications may be determinative in deciding 
the appropriateness of the forcible medication.112 
The Court qualified its four-part standard, however, stating that this 
standard applies only when the sole purpose of the government is to 
force the detainee to regain competence so that she may stand trial.113  
Additionally, the Court stated that there are strong reasons for a court to 
allow forced medication other than for the purpose of rendering a 
defendant competent to stand trial.114  As a result, the Court explained 
                                                 
109 Id.  The Court stated that a court in making this decision ought to consider issuing a 
court order backed by the contempt power of the court before actually ordering that the 
patient be forcibly administered the medication.  Id.  Most of these antipsychotic 
medications are administered by injection, an intrusive procedure.  See supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
110 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.  “[T]he Court must conclude that administration of the drugs is 
medically appropriate, i.e. in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical 
condition.”  Id.  For the government and its doctors to be able to satisfy the medical 
appropriateness factor, it would have to show that the proposed medications are both safe 
and humane, with minimal side effects that pose no grave risks to the patient and that if the 
drugs are not forcibly injected, then “the defendant would languish in the horrors of 
insanity and the failure to rescue the defendant from such a condition would be entirely 
opposed to his ‘medical interests.’”  Nance, supra note 63, at 707. 
111 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.  “The specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter here as 
elsewhere.”  Id.  The Court acknowledged that the different types of drugs used have 
varying levels of success and side effects.  Id. 
112 Nance, supra note 63, at 707.  “Different kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce 
different side effects and enjoy different levels of success.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
113 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
We emphasize that the court applying these standards is seeking to 
determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary 
significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely, the 
interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.  A court 
need not consider whether to allow forced medication for that kind of 
purpose, if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose. 
Id. at 181-82. 
114 Id. at 182.  The Court pointed out those factors such as dangerousness and 
manageability of a detainee provide stronger justifications for allowing for forced 
medication.  Id. 
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that it is necessary for the lower courts to look at other grounds for 
administering antipsychotic drugs forcibly before turning to the issue of 
trial competence for justification.115  The ultimate question should 
examine the burden in the light of the articulated standards that its 
interests outweigh the rights of the individual whom the government 
seeks to forcibly medicate.116 
E. Application of the Current Standard 
Many courts have had the opportunity to review cases involving the 
forced medication of pre-trial detainees with antipsychotic medications 
after the Sell standard was set in 2003.117  Some courts have used the 
standard to find that forcible medication was appropriate in the 
particular circumstances, while other courts have used the standard to 
                                                 
115 Id. at 183.  The Sell court stated that “the inquiry into whether medication is 
permissible . . . to render an individual nondangerous is usually more ‘objective and 
manageable’ than the inquiry into whether medication is permissible to render a defendant 
competent.”  Id. at 182 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
116 Id.  “Has the Government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible 
alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular course of antipsychotic drug 
treatment, shown a need for that treatment sufficiently important to overcome the 
individual’s protected interest in refusing it?”  Id. 
117 See United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1109 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming a district 
court decision finding the involuntary medication of a pre-trial detainee appropriate); 
United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 232 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that a trial court erred in 
ordering forced medication for a pre-trial detainee because of a failure to utilize the Sell 
standard); United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005) (remanding 
the decision for further determinations after the Sell standard was applied and a 
continuance refused to appeal a forcible medication order); United States v. Gomes, 387 
F.3d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1128 (2005) (affirming the district court 
ruling that forced medication was appropriate for the pre-trial detainee); United States v. 
Ghane, 392 F.3d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 2004) (reversing an order requiring forced medication of 
a pre-trial detainee in light of the government failing to meet the Sell standard); U.S. v. 
Martin, No. 1:04mj00183, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2005) 
(granting a motion to forcibly medicate a pre-trial detainee using the Sell standard); United 
States v. Dumeny, 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 133 (D. Me. 2004) (denying forced medication for a 
defendant charged with possession of a firearm due to the nature of the crime); Willis v. 
Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2004) 
(reversing a death sentence and conviction because of improper forced medication of the 
criminal defendant); United States v. Barajas-Torres, Crim. No. EP-03-CR-2011(KC), 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13232, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2004) (denying the forcible medication of a 
pre-trial detainee using the Sell standard). 
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find it inappropriate.118  The particular facts of each case are 
determinative in reaching the respective outcomes.119 
1. Cases Approving Forced Medication 
Courts have used the Sell standard to approve the forced medication 
of pre-trial detainees in some circumstances.120  The first case to analyze 
Sell and approve the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs was 
United States v. Gomes.121  In Gomes, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
stating that the Supreme Court did not articulate a standard of proof for 
the analysis of the Sell factors on appeal, applied the standard of “clear 
and convincing” evidence as supported by the Supreme Court’s findings 
in Riggins.122  The Gomes Court considered each of the Sell factors and 
concluded that it was appropriate to forcibly medicate the pre-trial 
detainee because there was a seventy percent chance that he would be 
rendered competent, therefore, the involuntary medication would 
further the strong government interest in trying the defendant.123  The 
                                                 
118 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
120 See Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107; Gomes, 387 F.3d 157; Martin, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477. 
121 387 F.3d 157.  In Gomes, Gomes was charged with possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  Id. at 159.  Gomes had previously been convicted of at least three violent 
felonies or drug offenses, and was therefore eligible for a mandatory fifteen-year prison 
term.  Id.  Gomes refused to cooperate with psychiatric evaluations, but after commitment 
for observation, he was found to suffer from delusions and a psychotic disorder, and he 
lacked an understanding of the proceedings against him.  Id.  The district court issued an 
order to forcibly medicate Gomes that was affirmed by the appellate court.  Id.  However, 
while his case was being appealed to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court decided Sell 
and vacated and remanded the order for further findings consistent with the Sell factors.  
Id.  The district court again found, on remand, after further evaluation and expert 
testimony, that forcible medication would be appropriate in this case, citing the seventy 
percent chance that Gomes could be restored to competency with the use of antipsychotic 
medicines.  Id.  Gomes appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  Id. 
122 Id. at 160.  The court stated that “The Supreme Court did not articulate a standard of 
proof to govern consideration of these factors.”  Id.  Because no standard of proof was 
explicitly stated, this lower court was required to determine the appropriate standard.  Id.  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the court in Gomes I had used the clear and 
convincing evidence standard and found that even though Gomes I was vacated and 
remanded, the lower court was correct in applying this standard to the case.  Id. 
123 Id. at 162.  The court in Gomes first had to determine if Sell applied to the facts of this 
case, indicating that the threshold question was “whether the forced treatment is justifiable 
for other reasons” besides trial competency.  Id. at 160.  Finding that Gomes was not a 
danger to himself or others and that his health would not be in danger if he did not take 
this medicine, this court found that the only reason that the government was seeking to 
forcibly medicate Gomes was to render him competent to stand trial.  Id.  The court then 
discussed what government interests were at stake in prosecuting Gomes, citing the strong 
government interest in prosecuting a person accused of a serious crime while noting that 
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Court specifically considered the government’s interest in trying Gomes 
to be very strong because of the seriousness of his crime.124 
After Gomes, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. 
Bradley,125 analyzed the facts of the situation, considering the medical 
appropriateness of the medication, including whether less intrusive 
means were available, the likelihood of whether the medication would 
render Bradley competent to stand trial, the likelihood that the side 
effects would compromise a fair trial, and the government’s interest in 
proceeding with the trial.126  After an analysis of these factors, the Tenth 
Circuit found that the lower court was not in error in determining that 
                                                                                                             
this interest may be weakened if the defendant faces a long civil commitment.  Id.  The 
court relied on its findings in Gomes I to determine that the crime was serious enough to 
provide a strong government interest.  Id.  Further, the court did not find persuasive 
Gomes’s argument that he should not be forcibly medicated because if he regained 
competence at a later date, he could still be tried, despite any length of time that may have 
passed.  Id. at 161.  Instead, this court determined that the government interests were 
strong enough to pass this prong of the Sell test.  Id.  Then, the court answered whether the 
forcible medication would substantially further the governmental interest in trying Gomes 
in the affirmative.  Id.  The court noted that there was a substantial probability that the 
medication would render Gomes competent and that the side effects of the medication 
would not interfere significantly with Gomes’s ability to assist his counsel.  Id. at 162.  The 
court then analyzed whether it was necessary to medicate Gomes forcibly or if there were 
other less intrusive means that would further the government’s interest.  Id.  Finding that 
other forms of treatment would likely be ineffective, the court found that the government 
passed this portion of the Sell test as well.  Id. at 162-63.  Finally, this court analyzed the 
medical appropriateness of the forced medication and accepted the evaluation of the 
psychiatrists who said that the treatment was indeed appropriate.  Id. at 163. 
124 Id. at 160.  “In this case, we believe that the government has an essential interest in 
bringing Gomes to trial. . . . Both the seriousness of the crime and Gomes’s perceived 
dangerousness to society are evident from the substantial sentence Gomes faces if 
convicted.”  Id. (quoting Gomes I, 289 F.3d at 86).  Gomes faced up to fifteen years if 
convicted on the charges.  Id. 
125 417 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005). 
126 Id. at 1114-17.  In Bradley, the defendant was accused of hurling a hand grenade at a 
group of salesmen in a car dealership parking lot because he had been dissatisfied with a 
purchase.  Id. at 1110.  Bradley attached a note to the grenade demanding the return of 
$26,000 that he believed the car dealership owed to him.  Id.  While being interviewed by 
law enforcement regarding the incident, Bradley admitted to the actions and told the 
authorities that he had weapons at his home because he believed that someone was trying 
to kill him.  Id.  Bradley was indicted for violating several federal laws regarding 
interruption of interstate commerce and unlawful possession of a weapon by a person 
convicted of a violent crime.  Id.  Bradley was found incompetent to stand trial, and, after 
extensive evaluation and court proceedings, ordered to take antipsychotic medications, 
which he refused.  Id.  at 1111-12. 
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forcible medication of this pre-trial detainee was appropriate, thus the 
Sell standard was considered met.127 
2. Cases Denying Forced Medication 
Although some post-Sell cases have allowed for the forcible 
medication of pre-trial detainees, others have denied the use of forcible 
medication.128  In United States v. Evans,129 the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that because the defendant’s crimes were serious, the 
government had an important interest in trying him, but had failed to 
prove that the involuntary medication would significantly further the 
interest in trying the defendant and that the drugs were medically 
appropriate.130  More specifically, Evans’s circumstances failed both the 
                                                 
127 Id. at 1117.  The appellate court found that the lower court adequately examined each 
of the requirements under Sell.  Id.  The court reviewed the findings of Bradley’s treating 
psychiatrist and found that they were adequate in assessing the medical appropriateness of 
the treatment.  Id. at 1114.  Additionally, the court noted that the lower court first 
considered less intrusive manners in which to treat Bradley before resorting to forced 
medication.  Id. at 1116.  The court then considered whether Bradley would be eligible for 
civil commitment in his state and found that he would not as his psychiatrist found that he 
was not a substantial danger to himself or others.  Id.  Further, the appellate court 
considered the length of time he had already been confined (nine months) and weighed it 
against his potential sentence (fifty years) and found that the forcible medication furthered 
the government’s interest in prosecuting this crime.  Id. at 1117. 
128 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
129 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). 
130 Id. at 237-42.  In Evans, the defendant, a seventy-four year old military veteran, was 
charged with assaulting a government employee and threatening to murder a United States 
judge after he went to a government office to complain about a late notice on a government 
housing loan.  Id. at 232-33.  Evans, while in the government office, became very loud and 
claimed that the late notice was proof that the government was out to get him.  Id. at 232.  
He indicated that “he was experienced . . . with chemical and biological warfare and . . . 
[they] [should] get the situation straightened out with his loan [because] . . . they didn’t 
[know what terrorism was] until they saw what he could do.”  Id. at 233 (internal citations 
omitted).  Evans was charged and ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to 
determine if he was competent to stand trial.  Id.  Evans refused the medication he was 
prescribed and proceedings commenced to force him to take the antipsychotic medications 
for his paranoid schizophrenia from which he had suffered for over thirty years.  Id.  A 
magistrate judge ordered that Evans be forcibly medicated, and Evans subsequently 
threatened to murder the judge who he thought was responsible for his continued holding 
in the facility.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the argument that 
the crime Evans was charged with was not sufficiently serious to provide the basis for an 
important government interest in prosecuting this defendant.  Id. at 237.  The court found 
that threatening to murder a United States judge, a crime that carries a penalty of up to ten 
years imprisonment, “is ‘serious’ under any reasonable standard.”  Id. at 238.  However, 
when considering the medical appropriateness of the medication and whether forcibly 
medicating the defendant would further the government’s interest in trying this crime, the 
Evans court found that the lower court erred in finding in the affirmative.  Id. at 240.  The 
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second and fourth prong of the Sell standard.131  The Evans court, 
interpreting Sell, held that in order for a court to properly assess whether 
involuntarily medication of antipsychotic agents is appropriate, the 
government must state the particular medication and its proposed 
dosage, because without that information, it would be giving the medical 
staff too much license to experiment.132  Further, the court emphasized 
that the treatment plan proposed must be tailored to the specific 
defendant so that it can be determined whether the proposed course of 
treatment, as applied to the specific defendant, would meet the 
standards set out by Sell.133 
                                                                                                             
lower court relied on a report that only generally described the medications that may have 
been used on Evans, and did not list which specific drug would be utilized in his treatment.  
Id.  The court held that, “the government must propose a course of treatment in which it 
specifies the particular drug to be administered.”  Id. at 240.  Further, the court found that 
the report relied upon only generalities and was not specific to Evans’s case, and therefore 
did not prove that it was either medically appropriate to forcibly medicate Evans, nor 
would it necessarily further the government’s interest in prosecuting his offense.  Id. at 241. 
131 Id. 
With respect to whether involuntary medication would “substantially 
further” the Government’s interest, the . . . report concluded that 
atypical antipsychotic medication would be “substantially likely” to 
restore Evans’s competency merely because such medication is the 
“primary” way to treat Schizophrenia. . . .  The report never addressed 
why it concluded that Evans, an elderly man with diabetes, 
hypertension, and asthma who takes a number of medications to treat 
these conditions, would not experience side effects that would 
interfere with his ability to assist counsel. With respect to whether 
involuntary medication would be “medically appropriate” for Evans, 
the IM report states only that involuntary medication is “medically 
appropriate” because “the standard treatment of anyone with [Evans] 
condition of Schizophrenia would involve the prescription of 
antipsychotic medication.” 
Id. 
132 Id. at 241.  The court stated that, “To approve of a treatment plan without knowing the 
proposed medication and dose range would give prison medical staff carte blanche to 
experiment with what might even be dangerous drugs or dangerously high doses of 
otherwise safe drugs and would not give defense counsel and experts a meaningful ability 
to challenge the propriety of the proposed treatment.”  Id. 
133 Id. at 242.  The court stated, “the government, considering all of the particular 
characteristics of the individual defendant relevant to such a determination, must first 
show that the treatment plan will ‘significantly further’ its interests.”  Id.  To do so, it must 
show that the treatment plan, as applied to the defendant in question would not only be 
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial, but would also be 
substantially unlikely to produce negative side effects that could significantly interfere 
with the defendant’s ability to assist his counsel.  Id. 
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While the court in Evans denied the forced medication based on the 
government’s failure to prove the medical appropriateness and failure to 
show that the medication would further the government’s interest, in 
United States v. Barajas-Torres,134 the court denied the forcible medication 
of a pre-trial detainee based on the government’s interest in prosecuting 
the particular crime.135  In Barajas-Torres, the court found that the 
treatment with anti-psychotic drugs was the only effective treatment for 
the defendant’s disorder and that it was the only likely way that the 
defendant would be restored to competency.136  Further, the court found 
that the side effects would be minimal and that it would likely be in the 
best interest of the defendant to be medicated.137  However, the court 
considered the seriousness of the crime that the defendant was charged 
with and decided that in light of Supreme Court decisions and in the 
context of involuntary medication, that seriousness was defined as “a 
serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property,” 
and the defendant in this matter was not charged with a serious crime.138 
The current standard clearly has been applied in favor of forcible 
medication and against it as well.139  However, when forcible medication 
is approved for pre-trial detainees, even after the current Sell standards 
are applied, dangers still exist that can compromise the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.140  Specifically, though certain safeguards are 
presented by the Sell factors, the Sixth Amendment Rights of pre-trial 
                                                 
134 United States v. Barajas-Torres, Crim. No. EP-03-CR-2011, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13232 
(W.D. Tex.  July 1, 2004). 
135 Id. at *10.  In Barajas-Torres, the defendant was charged with illegal reentry into the 
United States.  Id. at *2.  The defendant moved for and was granted a mental examination 
that determined that the defendant was suffering from schizophrenia.  Id. at *2-4. 
136 Id. at *4.  The court noted that “Under the circumstances of the present case, there is 
no question that the proposed anti-psychotic medication is the only effective treatment for 
defendant’s schizophrenia, and no alternative would restore the defendant to 
competency.”  Id. 
137 Id.  The court stated, “in light of medical testimony that schizophrenia, if left 
untreated in a patient defendant’s age, may result in a permanent mental disorder, the 
administration of anti-psychotic medication would likely serve defendant’s best interest.”  
Id. 
138 Id. at *6-10.  The court considered the possible sentence that Barajas could receive if 
convicted, the guidelines of which are zero to six months.  Id. at *11.  Because Barajas-
Torres had already served nine months in pre-trial confinement, he would be released for 
time served.  Id.  In light of these circumstances, the court held that “[p]rosecution for 
purposes of releasing defendant could not be considered an important interest.”  Id. 
139 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.  The dangers of interference with ability 
to communicate with counsel and the prejudicial effect of the defendant’s altered demeanor 
still exist despite compliance with the four Sell factors. 
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detainees remain in danger while they are forcibly medicated during 
their trials.141 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Though Supreme Court guidelines for determining the appropriate 
circumstances when a criminal defendant can be forcibly medicated for 
trial competency are now established, the standards are inadequate to 
protect the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants.142  Part III.A 
will discuss the inherent problems with the forcible medication of pre-
trial detainees after the Sell decision as they relate to Sixth Amendment 
rights, including why the current Sell standard is inadequate in 
protecting the Sixth Amendment rights of pre-trial detainees.143  Part 
III.A.1 will present the issue of prejudice to the defendant by altering his 
appearance and demeanor for the trier of fact and how this, in and of 
itself, violates the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant.144  Part 
III.A.2 explores the impact of the forced medication on the ability for a 
defendant to assist counsel in preparing her defense and how this also 
violates the detainee’s Sixth Amendment Rights.145  Finally, Part III.B will 
present the current remedies that are employed in combating these 
issues and why they do not relieve the dangers of violating the Sixth 
Amendment rights of criminal defendants.146 
A. The Current Standard Fails to Adequately Protect the Sixth Amendment 
Rights of Pre-trial Detainees 
Even with the application of the stringent four-part Sell test, the Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial may still be impaired if a defendant is 
forcibly medicated.147  The four-part standard articulated in Sell makes it 
more difficult for the government to forcibly medicate a pre-trial 
detainee for the sole purpose of rendering the defendant competent to 
stand trial.148  However, the Supreme Court made it perfectly clear that 
other justifications, such as potential dangerousness to one’s self or 
others, may allow for the forcible medication of pre-trial detainees, with 
                                                 
141 See infra Parts III.A–III.B. 
142 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
143 See infra Part III.A. 
144 See infra Part III.A.1. 
145 See infra Part III.A. 
146 See infra Part III.B. 
147 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.  This standard is rigid when 
considering medicating a person so that she is competent to stand trial.  Id. 
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the end result still establishing competence.149  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court encourages the government to seek out other reasons to justify 
forcibly medicating defendants other than trial competence.150  
Additionally, even when the government overcomes the four-part 
Sell standard, the effects of the medication on the defendant do not 
change.151  For example, overcoming the burdens of Sell does not mean 
that the defendant’s personal reaction to the medication, including 
drowsiness, muscle spasms, or tardive dyskinesia, will be any less 
severe.152  It simply does not follow that court-ordered approval of 
forcible medication will in any way lessen the side effects of the 
medication to the point where the drugs will not affect demeanor, nor 
interfere with communications between counsel and the defendant.153  
As a result, a few remedies, such as jury instructions and expert 
testimony, have been implemented to combat the negative effects on the 
fair trial rights of criminal defendants.154   
1. Altering the Demeanor of a Pre-trial Detainee Negatively Impacts 
Trial Fairness 
The potential side effects of antipsychotic medications pose a real 
risk to a pre-trial detainee’s right to a fair trial because they alter both the 
demeanor and appearance of the defendant.155  For example, some of the 
medications produce side effects, such as tics, that may make the 
                                                 
149 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.  See also Sell v. United States, 538 U.S. 166 
(2003). The Court indicated that there are other reasons why a person can constitutionally 
be forcibly medicated, such as dangerousness, and encourages prosecutors to look to other 
justifications to forcibly medicate a person besides trial competence.  Id. 
150 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.  The Court suggested using other 
justifications, especially one that the defendant may be dangerous to himself or others, in 
order to justify forcible medication instead of relying on the sole justification of restoring 
competency.  Sell, 528 U.S. at 183. 
151 See supra Part II.A (listing the side effects of medications on persons medicated with 
antipsychotic medications, no matter what the justification for administering the drugs).  A 
governmental approval on the medication will not abate side effects such as muscle 
spasms, “‘mask-like’ face,” sedation, or agitation.  See supra note 19. 
152 See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text (discussing the various potential side 
effects and the probability of their occurrence).  The medications used do not cure the 
underlying mental illness, but only control the symptoms so that the patient can be treated 
with other approaches, such as psychotherapy.  Ziegellmuller, supra note 1, at 836-37. 
153 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.  Various courts have recognized the 
inadequacy of a curative instruction in remedying the effect of the defendant’s altered 
demeanor on the jury.  Id. 
155 See supra Part II.C. 
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defendant appear nervous or fidgety.156  Another possible side effect is 
one that will dull the senses of the defendant, making her appear 
disinterested or unaffected by the testimony.157  These conditions may 
alter the jury’s perception of the defendant, thus influencing its 
deliberations and ultimate decision as to her guilt or innocence.158  It is 
evident that the current standard does not provide for a remedy to this 
problem, since no measures are in place that allow for a trier of fact to 
view the defendant prior to her being medicated with behavior-altering 
drugs.159 
Another way in which the side effects negatively impacts the 
defendant as to her demeanor relates to the possible defense that she 
may raise.160  For example, obviously the defense of insanity may be 
raised in cases where the defendant has been forcibly medicated with 
antipsychotic medication when she has been found to have a mental 
illness that requires medication.161  The defendant arguing an insanity 
defense will have a tough hurdle to overcome when the medication dulls 
her senses so that her demeanor is different from her demeanor at the 
time of the alleged crime.162  When the jury is considering whether to 
find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, their perception of 
                                                 
156 See supra note 69-70 and accompanying text.  Tardive dyskenesia commonly manifests 
with involuntary muscle spasms and rigidity in the limbs.  Stone, supra note 17, at 306. 
157 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  The side effect termed akinesia can alter a 
defendant’s demeanor so that he, in mild cases, will appear to lack the ability to have 
spontaneous expression, and in extreme cases, will manifest a wooden, “‘mask-like’ face.”  
Page, supra note 16, at 1068. 
158 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  Justice Kennedy stated, “The drugs can 
prejudice the accused . . . by altering his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice his 
reactions and presentation in the courtroom.”  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  See also Peterson’s Stoicism, supra note 71.  The jury in the Peterson 
trial indicated that the demeanor of the defendant was “unsettling.”  Id. 
159 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.  The current Sell four-part standard 
allows for the forcible medication of pre-trial detainees, but does not implement any 
measures to safeguard any rights that are compromised by allowing the medication to take 
place.  In the standard itself, there is no mention of any method to combat the negative 
impression that the medicated demeanor of the defendant will have on the trier of fact. 
160 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  In addition to possibly affecting the type of 
defense that the defendant will be willing to proffer, the medication may render the 
defendant less willing or able to actually take part in any part of the defense.  Riggins, 504 
U.S. at 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
161 See supra note 91.  Justice Kennedy stated that “The drugs can prejudice the accused 
. . . by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel.”  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
162 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  The court recognized that the demeanor of 
the defendant not only influenced the guilt-innocence phase, but also sentencing. 
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the defendant during the trial proceedings may also affect their 
verdict.163 
Finally, when the outward demeanor of the defendant is affected, the 
sentencing phase of a trial can be impacted as well.164  For example, in 
Riggins, the Supreme Court found that the potential negative side effects 
of the drug Melaril with which the defendant was forcibly injected were 
likely to have impacted his right to a fair trial.165  In particular, Justice 
Kennedy noted that the demeanor of the defendant is crucial during the 
sentencing phase where the trier of fact is making a determination 
between life and death for the defendant.166  Further, in Cockrell, a court 
in the Western District of Texas reversed a murder conviction and death 
sentence due in part to the effect that the defendant’s medicated 
demeanor had on the jury.167  The current standard fails to address a 
method to solve the problems of negative perception of the defendant by 
the jury.168  However, the outward appearance of the defendant is not the 
only concern caused by forcibly medicating the defendant with 
antipsychotic medications.169 
2. Forcible Administration of Antipsychotic Medications Interferes 
with Communications with Counsel 
In addition, the current standard fails to address the problem created 
by impaired communications between the defendant and her counsel.170  
                                                 
163 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  In one case, a Texas court vacated a death 
penalty sentence based in part on the prejudicial effect of the defendant’s demeanor on the 
jury.  Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950, at *148 (W.D. Tex. 
July 21, 2004). 
164 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  If a jury has convicted a defendant in part 
based on his medicated demeanor, it is reasonable to infer that the same demeanor will also 
impact the sentencing phase of the trial. 
166 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  Justice Kennedy stressed the impact of the 
demeanor during the sentencing phase.  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
167 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra notes 73-76.  Justice Kennedy foresaw this problem as he noted that 
demeanor of the defendant can influence the jury.  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
169 See supra Part III.A.1 (listing the varied outward manifestations that can be caused by 
antipsychotic medications). 
170 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.  The current standard fails to provide 
any remedy for correcting the negative impact on communications ability.  By the vary 
nature of the medication itself, and by forcibly medicating a defendant with this 
medication, the communications are hampered  The only true way to remedy this situation 
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Along with impacting the perception of the defendant by the trier of fact, 
the side effects of antipsychotic medications also impact the manner in 
which a defendant can interact with counsel.171  In order for a defendant 
to mount an effective defense, she must be able to communicate with her 
attorney.172  When antipsychotic medications are introduced into a 
defendant’s body, the drugs, by their very nature, alter the thought 
processes of the defendant.173  When a defendant’s state of mind is 
altered, communications with her counsel may be impaired.174 
Some experts assert that the introduction of these antipsychotic 
medications can actually improve communications between the 
medicated client and her counsel.175  However, for the most part, these 
medications are thought to hamper rather than assist the ability to 
communicate.176  Once a defendant is unable to effectively communicate, 
or when her communication is in fact controlled by medication, she will 
not have assistance of counsel, her Sixth Amendment rights will be 
violated, and her subsequent trial will be rendered unfair.177 
Additionally, the introduction of antipsychotic medications, in 
altering the thinking of the pre-trial detainee, may also alter the defense 
strategy that she would have normally pursued if not medicated.178  If 
                                                                                                             
would be to not forcibly medicate the defendant, a proposition the Supreme Court does not 
seem willing to consider at this time. 
171 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  The Court recognized that the possible side 
effects of the medications can hamper a person’s ability to communicate.  Riggins, 504 U.S. 
at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
172 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  Additionally, Justice Kennedy asserted, 
“[i]n my view medication of the type here prescribed may be for the very purpose of 
imposing constraints on the defendant’s own will, and for that reason its legitimacy is put 
in grave doubt.”  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
173 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  Some of the benefits of the medication 
include altering the thinking patterns of the patient so that disjointed thoughts and 
hallucinations are abated.  Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 667. 
174 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  One possible effect of the medication is 
adverse effect on the thinking process.  Cichon, supra note 19, at 322. 
175 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  While these antipsychotic medications may 
rid the detainee of delusions and hallucinations, the negative side effects of tardive 
dyskinesia, restlessness, drowsiness, involuntary facial movements, and involuntary limb 
movements are still possible.  Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 667. 
176 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  Psychotropic medications can dull the 
senses so that the person seems and feels emotionless.  It follows that when a person is in 
such a state, she may not consider the implications of not pursuing or pursing various lines 
of defenses.  She may not fully understand and comprehend the ramifications of strategies 
or defenses proposed to her by her counsel. 
177 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
178 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/8
2006] Forcibly Medicating Criminal Defendants 489 
the defendant in the medicated state now feels “normal,” she may not 
wish to pursue an insanity defense that she would have considered 
pursuing if she was not medicated.179  In addition, a medicated 
defendant, with emotions dulled, might not pursue the most vigorous 
options in a defense strategy.180  For these reasons, the forcible 
medication of pre-trial detainees with antipsychotic medications 
infringes on Sixth Amendment rights. 
B. The Current Remedies To Cure Sixth Amendment Problems with Forcible 
Medication Are Inadequate 
Though no remedies specifically appear within Sell, courts have 
utilized different approaches to attempt to remedy the Sixth Amendment 
concerns implicated by forcibly medicating pre-trial detainees.181  
However, those approaches are wholly inadequate.182  First, as to the 
issue of altered demeanor, the jury is told how the defendant acted and 
appeared before medication, and the jury does not get to see for itself the 
defendant in her unmedicated state.183  Instead, jurors hear a recitation of 
the defendant’s mental state prior to medication.184  Because these 
medications have so many side effects that can impact the demeanor and 
appearance of the defendant, the jury may focus on the current mental 
state of the defendant, ignoring that the mental state at the time of the 
crime was completely different.185  The jury may in fact ignore that the 
defendant ever was in a different mental state, based on her current 
conduct.186  Though appearances can be deceiving, and a person can 
deliberately act as if she is mentally ill, presenting the defendant in an 
unmedicated state would provide powerful evidence to the jury to 
                                                 
179 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.  Courts have utilized both jury 
instructions regarding medication as well as the use of expert testimony in explaining the 
medicated demeanor of criminal defendants. 
182 See supra notes 84, 88 and accompanying text.  Both solutions are perceived as being 
practically unworkable towards solving the problems presented by the side effects of the 
medications. 
183 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  A jury instruction is given orally and does 
not erase the visual image that the trier of fact has seen during the trial. 
184 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2004) (acknowledging the impact of 
the defendant’s medicated demeanor on a defendant in both the guilt-innocence phase and 
the sentencing phase of the trial). 
186 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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decide if that state was only a deliberate effect or was representative of 
the defendant’s true mental state.187 
In appearing cold and emotionless, the defendant’s ability to garner 
a fair sentence if convicted is also hampered.188  If the jury has already 
determined guilt while the defendant is in a medicated state, it could be 
influenced by those same observations while considering a sentence.189  
A jury may even consider the reaction of the defendant to the conviction 
itself and impose the sentence based in part on that reaction.190 
Additionally, the other main remedy utilized, a jury instruction, is 
ineffective in curing the negative impact that medication can have on the 
communications between client and counsel and problems with altered 
demeanors.191  Simply informing the jury that the defendant is in a 
medicated state, and that the jury may not consider the demeanor of the 
defendant when determining guilt or innocence, is clearly not an 
adequate solution.192  Finally, even if a curative instruction could solve 
the problem, in considering that the government has an interest in 
maintaining the integrity of the trial process by conducting fair trials, the 
government cannot be said to have an interest in conducting a trial with 
such a high risk of jury prejudice known prior to the trial commencing.193 
Consequently, the forcible medication of criminal defendants with 
psychotropic medications impacts fair trial rights in many ways.194  The 
courts’ recognition of the constitutional problems is evidenced by courts’ 
incorporation of different remedies, such as jury instructions and expert 
                                                 
187 See supra notes 83-85.  Allowing a defendant to present himself in an unmedicated 
state displays his demeanor when he is not subject to drugs that by their nature alter the 
chemistry of the brain.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  Whether the defendant’s 
behavior while in this unmedicated state is representative of his true mental state is a 
matter for the finder of fact to determine.  Not allowing the defendant to communicate his 
mental state without being under the influence of thought altering drugs deprives him of 
the right to raise an adequate defense. 
188 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  If a defendant continues to show little to no 
reaction to his surroundings at the time the conviction is read, the jury may interpret that 
as a sign of indifference or lack of remorse and impose a harsher sentence as a result. 
191 See supra note 87 (discussing the inadequacy of jury instructions as they relate to the 
demeanor of the defendant). 
192 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  Relying on jury instructions to cure 
evidentiary problems of this nature is neither realistic nor practical. 
193 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra Part II.C. 
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testimony, to combat the effects of psychotropic medications.195  These 
clearly inadequate remedies could easily be supplemented by new 
evidentiary and procedural rules to safeguard the fundamental rights of 
criminal defendants.196 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Forcible medication of criminal detainees for the purpose of 
rendering them competent to stand trial implicates many constitutional 
rights, especially the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a fair trial.  In this 
section, two “fixes” to the current problem are presented.197  First, this 
section will discuss the use of videotape and how the use of videotape 
will assist in alleviating the prejudicial effect on a criminal defendant 
who has been forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs so that she 
can be deemed competent for trial.  Second, this section will propose a 
new rule of evidence, creating a rebuttable presumption of “not guilty by 
reason of mental disease or defect” in cases where the defendant has 
been forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs.  Finally, this section 
will discuss how these two proposals, used in tandem, will effectively 
reduce the dangers of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
violation. 
A. Using Videotape Evidence of the Defendant’s Behavior Before Forcible 
Medication  
No detailed procedure for videotaping a pretrial detainee prior to 
forcible medication has been proposed or implemented.  The following 
section will describe a new rule of criminal procedure, detailing methods 
regarding the videotaping of a criminal defendant prior to forcible 
medication with psychotropic medications, to ensure that the evidence is 
an accurate representation of the demeanor of the defendant. 
                                                 
195 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
196 See infra Part IV. 
197 Note, the problem of ineffective communication with counsel is much more 
problematic to solve than the issue of the defendant’s demeanor.  By the very nature of the 
act of medicating the defendant, the communications are compromised and the Sixth 
Amendment rights of the defendant are implicated.  The only viable solution to the 
communications aspect would be to halt the practice of forcibly medicating pre-trial 
detainees, a solution that the Supreme Court seems unwilling to consider at this point.  See 
Sell v. United States, 538 U.S. 166 (2003) (detailing a four-part standard for permitting 
forcible medication of pre-trial detainees).  The Contribution in this Note provides a 
mechanism for lessening the impact of the altered demeanor of the defendant, for which a 
possible and realistic solution exists. 
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1. A New Rule of Criminal Procedure 
Once a court has ordered the forcible medication of a criminal 
defendant for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand 
trial, the defendant will have the option to be videotaped such 
that his unmedicated demeanor and behavior can be presented 
to the jury during the trial.  In order to ensure that the tape 
presented to the jury is an accurate representation of the 
demeanor of the defendant, the following procedural 
safeguards must be followed:  
  
1. The tape shall be recorded by a court appointed person who 
is capable of swearing in witnesses.  The session shall be 
treated as if it were a formal deposition.   
2. Both the prosecution and the defense counsel shall be 
present at the videotaping.   
3. The videotaping shall consist of two parts. 
(a) A question and answer session with a neutral 
psychiatrist. The question and answer period 
duration shall be at the discretion of the psychiatrist; 
and 
(b) A taping the defendant’s behavior and demeanor 
while the defendant is alone for a duration of at least 
fifteen minutes but no longer than thirty minutes. 
4.  After the taping is completed, two copies will be made from 
the source tape, with one copy being distributed to each 
counsel, and the source tape being retained by the court.   
5.  When the time for presenting the tape arrives at trial, it 
will be viewed in its entirety and from the source tape only. 
Neither party will have the option to present an edited version 
of the tape for the trier of fact. 
2. Commentary 
One of the most significant problems with forcibly medicating a 
criminal detainee with psychotropic medications is that the side effects 
of the medication alter not only the thinking patterns of the defendant, 
but also produce detrimental physical reactions.198  If a jury is explicitly 
told of the medication that the defendant is taking and the side effects 
that it may produce, it is possible that the jury will understand that the 
defendant is not in her normal state.  However, by producing videotape 
                                                 
198 See supra Part II.C. 
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that can show the trier of fact the unmedicated state of the defendant, the 
jury will see for themselves how the defendant appeared not only before 
medication, but also at the time of the alleged crime.  Since the 
prosecution has already been able to forcibly take away the “in-person” 
evidence by medicating the defendant, the next best alternative would be 
videotape. 
With videotape, there is always a concern that it will be altered so 
that the true depictions of the events on the tape are not presented.  By 
implementing the aforementioned procedures, the opportunities to alter 
crucial evidence are reduced.  First, by requiring a court officer to be 
present, the court itself oversees the process.  This court officer will 
witness the entire event, and if alterations are made, the officer should 
testify to such alteration.  Second, with the court retaining the source 
tape and the source tape being the only tape allowed for viewing at the 
trial, the parties will not have a chance to edit the tape to eliminate any 
damaging statements that the defendant may have made during the 
examination.  Finally, with the tape being shown in its entirety, or not at 
all, the jury will get a full picture of the defendant’s demeanor without 
any editing. 
Videotape alone will not provide a solution to the problem of jury 
bias that is presented by forcible medication of criminal detainees with 
psychotropic medications. The jury will indeed see a visual 
representation of the true demeanor of the defendant, but this alone is 
not enough to cure the defect in the entire process.  Expert testimony 
corroborating not only what is on the videotape, but also other 
observations of the defendant would aid in presenting to the jury an 
accurate representation of the defendant’s unmedicated mental state.  
Along with the expert testimony and videotape, additional safeguards 
are needed from the court itself, to ensure that the trier of fact is fully 
aware of the defendant’s true demeanor and mental state. 
B. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence:  An Inference of Incompetence 
Because videotape alone will provide an inadequate solution to the 
problems created by forcibly medicating criminal detainees with 
psychotropic medications, an additional component is necessary to 
further remedy the Sixth Amendment concerns raised by forcible 
medication.  Jury instructions alone are not adequate; something with 
more force is necessary to stress to the trier of fact that a medicated 
defendant is competent to stand trial only because of this medication.  To 
do this, a new rule of evidence is called for. 
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The new rule, with text set out below, creates an inference that the 
defendant lacked the adequate mens rea to commit the crime because the 
government has met the requirements to forcibly medicate that person to 
stand trial.  Though this rule is proposed as a Federal Rule of Evidence, 
states would have the option of adopting this rule as written, with 
modifications, or not at all.  Below, this Note sets out the text of the 
proposed new rule, followed by a proposed comment by the Advisory 
Committee and an explanation of how this rule, in tandem with 
videotape and other remedies, will further assist in resolving the Sixth 
Amendment concerns raised by forcibly medicating a criminal detainee 
with psychotropic medications. 
1. Proposed Rule 
Rule XXX.  Inferences in Criminal Proceedings Wherein the 
Defendant Has Been Forcibly Medicated with Antipsychotic 
or Psychotropic Medications. 
In all criminal actions where the defendant has been forcibly 
medicated with psychotropic or antipsychotic medications, an 
inference will be established that the defendant, incompetent to 
stand trial without medication, also lacked competence at the 
time the crime was committed, only if the defendant was also 
in an unmedicated state at the time the alleged crime was 
committed.  The prosecution will be afforded the opportunity 
to rebut this inference by producing clear and convincing 
evidence that despite the fact that the defendant is now in a 
state that requires medication to establish competency, the 
defendant had the requisite mens rea at the time of the crime.  
In the case of a jury trial, the jury will be instructed that the 
defendant has been medicated against her will to establish trial 
competence, and will be informed of the medical diagnosis of 
the defendant.  The jury will be told that they may infer that 
because of the forcible medication of the defendant, that she 
was not legally responsible for her actions at the time the 
crime was committed, if the prosecution is unable to rebut the 
inference at trial. 
2. Proposed Comment 
 The purpose of this Rule is to protect the Sixth 
Amendment fair trial rights of a criminal defendant in the 
particular circumstance where the defendant has been 
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medicated against her will with psychotropic drugs for the 
purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.  
The medical and legal communities, including the Supreme 
Court, have acknowledged the side effects of psychotropic 
drugs.  See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).  By 
affording the defendant this inference, the disadvantages that 
are imposed on her by this medication, though not completely 
eradicated, will be substantially reduced and it will be more 
likely that the defendant will receive a fair trial. 
 Rule XXX is to be applied in very narrow circumstances.  
This rule is to be applied only when the defendant has been 
forcibly medicated against her will with psychotropic or 
antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering the 
accused competent to stand trial.  Upon request of the 
defendant who has been so medicated, the judge must give 
instruction to the jury as to the inference as well as inform the 
jury of the defendant’s medical diagnosis and that the 
defendant would not be able to stand trial without the 
medication. 
 This rule creates a permissive inference, not a 
presumption, therefore not interfering with the guarantee to a 
trial by jury found in the Sixth Amendment. This Rule is seen 
as a balancing factor to counteract the disadvantages, such as 
altered demeanor and impairment of communications with 
counsel, that the defendant will be under when forcibly 
medicated. 
3. Commentary 
Creating a presumption in a criminal trial can be problematic as the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a jury 
trial.199  However, this rule creates a permissive inference that the jury 
may find that the defendant was not competent by the fact that the 
prosecution has forcibly medicated her.  Ultimately, it is for the jury to 
determine whether the defendant was culpable for the offense with 
which she is charged. Further, this inference is protective of the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by creating an inference in the 
defendant’s favor as opposed to providing a presumption in the 
government’s favor. 
                                                 
199 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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Showing a videotape of the defendant in an unmedicated state, 
along with expert testimony, can only go so far in allaying the concerns 
caused by forcible medication.  By creating this rule of evidence, the jury 
will be informed before deliberation that the defendant’s current state is 
not representative of her unmedicated state.  This instruction further 
bolsters the idea that the medications alter the demeanor of the 
defendant.  The judge instructing the jury on this very matter will further 
allow the jury to consider the implications of the medication and how it 
has impacted the defendant’s demeanor.  When the videotaped evidence 
is coupled with the inference, the defendant has a much better chance of 
receiving a fair trial. 
Additionally, this inference contains many caveats:  the defendant 
must not have been medicated at the time the alleged crime was 
committed and the prosecution may rebut the inference.  If the 
defendant was similarly medicated at the time the crime was allegedly 
committed, the jury will not be instructed on the inference, as it is not 
necessary.  The demeanor and mental state of the defendant at the time 
of trial would then be representative of the mental state of the defendant 
at the time the crime was allegedly committed.  Further, the prosecution 
will have the opportunity to show the mental state of the defendant at 
the time of the alleged crime.  If the jury finds that the defendant had the 
requisite mens rea at the time of the crime despite this inference, then the 
defendant has received as fair of a trial as possible while being forcibly 
medicated. 
Some solutions have already been implemented to correct the 
inherent Sixth Amendment violations in forcibly medicating pre-trial 
detainees for the purpose of trial competence, and these solutions are a 
good start.200  However, with the addition of both videotaping the 
defendant in an unmedicated state and a rebuttable inference of 
incompetence, the defendant will be afforded more protection of her 
fundamental rights.  Though these two new protections do not 
completely remedy the problem, they assist in the recovery of the 
defendant’s guaranteed Sixth Amendment protections. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Flashback to jury deliberations in the trial on which you serve as the 
foreperson.  Instead of simply hearing a doctor tell you and your fellow 
                                                 
200 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/8
2006] Forcibly Medicating Criminal Defendants 497 
jurors about the defendant’s mental state before his medication, the 
defense presents a videotape of the defendant before he was medicated.  
The person in the courtroom seems to be a totally different person than 
the one on the tape. His incoherent answers to the psychiatrist’s 
questions, his pacing and inability to stay still, and his seemingly wild 
tale of how his wife and children were out to get him made a substantial 
impression on the jury. After the judge gives the instructions, 
deliberations begin, taking an entirely different direction.  This time, the 
jury is unanimous once again, but the defendant instead will be getting 
the mental treatment he needs at a psychiatric facility, instead of prison 
confinement. 
Forcibly medicating a criminal detainee for the purposes of 
rendering her competent to stand trial presents many constitutional 
issues.  Most notably, the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a fair trial has 
been trampled.  Not only is the ability to communicate with counsel 
damaged, but the very demeanor of the defendant is altered, causing the 
jury to potentially view the defendant in an exceedingly negative 
manner. 
The ultimate remedy to this problem would be for the Supreme 
Court to recognize that forcibly medicating a criminal defendant violates 
that defendant’s constitutional rights. However, the Court has seemingly 
decided otherwise by providing criteria allowing this process to occur.  
To combat the negative effects of this process, two bandages can be 
applied to patch the problems caused by forcible medication.  First, 
videotaping a defendant under controlled conditions prior to forcibly 
medicating the defendant can provide the trier of fact with a visual 
representation of the true demeanor of the defendant.  Second, by 
instituting a presumption that a forcibly medicated defendant did not 
have the requisite mens rea at the time of the alleged crime, the trier of 
fact will be forced to examine more closely not only the side effects of the 
medication but also the state of mind of the defendant.  These two 
solutions, used alone or in tandem, would improve the current standards 
in place under Sell. 
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